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Predation causes a lot of suffering in the wild. Yet, a lot of people believe 
it is morally permissible. This article presents an ethical principle that jus-
tifies (condones) predation without referring to anthropocentric notions 
such as moral agency or species membership. The moral intuition that 
predation is permissible is coherent with other intuitions about harmful 
behaviors in the wild, such as the permissibility of some kinds of procrea-
tion (for example r-selection) that do not sufficiently contribute to well-
being. These intuitions can be unified in an ethical principle that uses the 
three conditions of naturalness, normality and necessity. Furthermore, this 
3-N-principle is related to the intrinsic value of biodiversity. Finally, some 
analogies between well-being of a sentient being and biodiversity of an eco-
system are discussed.
1. introduction: intuitionS about prEdation, motion
 and procrEation
A lot of anti-speciesist animal rights activists and ethicists have the moral 
intuition that predation in the wild is permissible, in the sense that one 
does not have a duty to intervene and protect prey, and that we do not even 
have a reason to desire the prohibition of predation. It is not clear how this 
hands-off or laissez-faire approach of non-intervention is compatible with 
non-anthropocentric basic rights and the value of well-being. 
Predators are not moral agents who can reason and understand the 
notions of rights and duties. Predators are amoral (Regan 1983). However, 
this cannot be a valid reason to allow predation: what if highly intelligent 
dolphins were a little bit more intelligent, such that their current proto-
morality would become a fully-fledged morality? Even then my intuition 
says that those dolphins are allowed to kill many sentient fish for food. One 
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could simply refer to the species distinction and claim that any being who 
is not homo sapiens is allowed to hunt and can also be eaten. But a mere 
reference to a species is arbitrary.
We can make it even more personal with another example about bodily 
motion. What if scientists discover that insects are sentient beings? Should 
we be allowed to move around and kill many sentient insects even if by 
accident? My intuition says that we do not have a duty to stop moving. 
The speciesist Homo sapiens solution, Regan’s “moral agents” solution 
as well as the related libertarian solution proposed by Ebert and Machan 
(2012), cannot explain this intuition: as moral agents (or as homo sapiens), 
we have a responsibility not to harm other sentient beings. Furthermore, 
if we died because we stopped moving, it is not obvious that new ecologi-
cal disasters, such as overpopulation and mass starvation of insects, would 
occur. Hence, reference to possible ecological disasters and unforeseen 
side-effects (Singer 1973; Simmons 2009) is not sufficient either.
Perhaps our pro predation intuition is a moral illusion. However, this 
intuition is not only coherent with my pro motion intuition, but also with 
my pro procreation intuition: some kinds of procreation are harmful in the 
sense that the sentient beings who are born do not sufficiently contribute 
to (some measure of aggregated) well-being. The most extreme example 
of harmful procreation might be r-selection: an evolutionary reproductive 
strategy where animals have a very high reproduction rate but a very low 
individual survival rate (Horta 2010). Most of those animals have a very 
short life and an early death. If they develop sentience, they have very few 
opportunities for positive experiences. Perhaps they have lives not worth 
living at all.
2. naturalnESS and thE valuE of biodivErSity
I have three coherent moral intuitions: predation, motion and procreation 
are each allowed. This coherence implies that it becomes less likely that the 
predation intuition is a moral illusion. But we can make the case stronger. 
In search for a “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 1971), I propose an ethi-
cal principle that unifies the moral intuitions in those three different cases. 
This 3-N-principle is inspired by the three N’s of justification in the ideol-
ogy of carnism (Joy 2002): eating meat is natural, normal and necessary. 
This position has two problems: first, it does not recognize that meat is 
not necessary for humans to life a healthy life (ADA 2009). Second, it is 
not clear what “natural” means. Nevertheless, perhaps those elements of 
a speciesist carnist perspective can be used to make an antispeciesist ethic 
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of animal equality coherent with our predation, motion and procreation 
intuitions. 
Let us define or interpret naturalness as a property of a type of behav-
ior (such as predation or procreation): a behavior is natural if it originates 
from a blind process of natural evolution instead of being for example a 
conscious, reflective, non-instinctive invention. Such inventions are ‘arti-
ficial’ instead of “natural”. Furthermore, normality simply means that the 
behavior occurs a lot and necessity means that the behavior is required for 
the survival of individuals and populations. The 3-N-principle now says 
that: 
If a behavior is both normal, natural and necessary, it is always allowed, even 
if it is harmful and violates rights and well-being. In other words, if (a) a suf-
ficiently large group of sentient beings became by (b) an evolutionary pro-
cess (c) dependent for their survival on harmful behavior, they are allowed to 
perform that behavior for survival.  1
Predation, motion and procreation are all natural behaviors (they origi-
nated by a blind evolutionary process), they happen a lot, and they are nec-
essary for the survival of individuals and populations. Hence, these types 
of behavior are permissible. On the other hand, other harmful behaviors 
are not permissible, because at least one of the three N criteria are not met. 
Consumption of animal products by humans is harmful and not neces-
sary, hence not allowed. Forced organ transplantation (sacrificing some-
one against his/her will and using his/her organs in order to save another 
patient) is harmful and not natural, hence not allowed  2. Road kill (killing 
sentient beings by cars) is morally wrong, because cars are not natural. And 
if a few animals develop (by evolution) a new type of behavior that is neces-
sary for their survival but harms others, this new behavior may be necessary 
and natural, but it is not (yet) normal, and therefore not permissible. 
The three N conditions come in degrees: one type of behavior can be 
more normal or more necessary than another. This implies that the more 
normal, necessary and natural a behavior is, the more it becomes permis-
sible and the more it can trump the value of well-being.
 1 We are also allowed to intervene and protect ourselves, our loved ones and the 
prey if we are inclined to do so, and we do have a duty to intervene once feasible alterna-
tives such as healthy vegan food for the predators or selective contraception for some 
animals are available.
 2 Both predation and forced organ transplantation are cases where someone is killed, 
his/her bodily tissue (meat, organs) are taken and put in someone else’s body (predator, 
patient) in order for the latter to survive. Yet, the naturalness criterion makes the distinc-
tion between these two cases.
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We see that my predation, motion and procreation intuitions become 
even more coherent, because they fit with an ethical principle that refers to 
notions that many people care about: naturalness and necessity (survival). 
These notions even appear in a carnist ideology, but we can go one step 
further. Consider the no-harm principle. This principle corresponds to our 
moral intuitions, but moreover there exists a natural property called well-
being. If we give intrinsic value to this natural property, then the intuitions 
behind the no-harm principle are coherent with this value of well-being.
Could we do the same for the 3-N-principle? Does there exist a natural 
property that we can value and that is coherent with the 3-N-principle? 
The answer is affirmative. I suggest that the 3-N-principle is connected to 
the moral value of biodiversity, at least if we define biodiversity as: “All 
variation in life forms, entities and processes that are the direct result of 
natural evolution, where natural evolution is generated by random genetic 
mutations”. This definition explicitly excludes intentional, intelligent inter-
ventions such as genetic modification. Our intelligence is a direct result of 
evolution, but the product of this intelligence, i.e. the intentional creation 
of new genes or life forms, does not contribute to biodiversity because bio-
diversity is only defined in terms of the direct results of a blind process of 
evolution, excluding indirect results. The importance of this exclusion of 
genetic modification will be discussed in a later section.
The 3-N-principle is connected to the value of biodiversity as follows (for 
a deeper discussion, see Bruers 2014). If a behavior is natural, it contributes 
to biodiversity by definition. If it is natural and normal, it contributes a lot to 
biodiversity, and if a behavior is natural, normal and necessary, biodiversity 
would drastically decrease if that behavior was prohibited and so no longer 
existed. Such a large decrease in biodiversity could be considered worse than 
violations of rights and well-being involved in the harmful behavior. 
Of course, if we were to intervene in a single instance of predation, 
stopping an individual predator, biodiversity would not be in danger. 
Yet, we would not have a duty to intervene in such a singular occurrence. 
Therefore, the connection between the 3-N-principle and biodiversity only 
works if we specify the notion of a duty. When we say we have a duty to 
prevent this predator from hunting prey in this specific situation, what 
we imply is that we should be willing to accept a universal prevention of 
predation (anywhere, at all times, in all similar situations). A prohibition 
means a universal prohibition, not only for this single predator, but for all 
predators. Consequently, a lot of biodiversity would be lost. That is why 
there is no duty to stop the single predator.
Predation, motion and procreation are allowed because a universal 
prohibition of those types of behavior would result in a severe decrease in 
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biodiversity, but what kind of value does biodiversity have and how valu-
able is it? Biodiversity has instrumental value, in the sense that it can con-
tribute to (aggregated) well-being. Yet, if scientists discover that interven-
ing in nature and decreasing biodiversity would be better for well-being, 
my intuition still says that predation, motion and procreation are permis-
sible. Therefore, I suggest biodiversity has an intrinsic (non-instrumental, 
non-empirical) value, which means that it is independent on contingent 
empirical scientific discoveries.
Biodiversity does not always trump well-being. The value of an amount 
of biodiversity should be weighed against the value of an amount of (aggre-
gated) well-being. If moral agents are the source of intrinsic value, then 
it is up to us, as moral agents, to decide which one of those values is the 
strongest. It will be an intuitive judgment requiring balancing; moral agents 
can democratically arrive at mutual agreement on the strengths of those 
values  3.
3. an analogy bEtwEEn biodivErSity and wEll-bEing
We can draw some analogies between well-being and biodiversity, not to 
justify the intrinsic value of biodiversity, but to make it a bit more coherent 
and a more plausible.
1. Sentient beings have a tendency to increase their well-being, because 
these beings have multiple needs, and they are looking for strategies 
to satisfy their needs as much as possible (trade-offs, resource scarcity 
and incompatible strategies limit their growth in well-being, though). 
Analogously, ecosystems have a tendency to increase their biodiversity, 
because these ecosystems consist of procreating living beings, and they 
are subject to genetic variation (natural selection due to resource scarcity 
limits the growth of biodiversity, however).
2. Consciousness underlies well-being, just as naturalness underlies bio-
diversity. However, only positive conscious experiences contribute to 
 3 As well-being is not objectively interpersonally comparable (my qualia of happi-
ness are measured in different units to your qualia of happiness, similar to the way that 
seeing red may be different for different persons), and as there is no objective way to 
aggregate well-being (should we take the sum, the average or a weighted average?), intui-
tive balancing is unavoidable even in a consequentialist welfare ethic. Moral agents might 
still come to a democratic agreement on how to measure, value and balance everyone’s 
well-being. The same goes for the inclusion of a new intrinsic value, such as biodiversity, 
that is not objectively comparable to well-being.
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well-being, just as necessary natural behaviors are important for bio-
diversity. Normal necessary natural behaviors correspond with intense 
positive conscious experiences.
3. Both well-being and biodiversity are a collection (variation) of differ-
ent things that we can value: pleasure, friendship and reading a good 
book all contribute to well-being, just like genes, taxonomies (species) 
and biotic communities contribute to biodiversity. Both well-being and 
biodiversity are natural properties that are difficult to express in one 
number, but we are able to see large increases and decreases. 
4. Well-being is the result of preference satisfaction, just as biodiversity 
is the result of evolution. Defining well-being as the variation of all 
positive feelings that are the result of preference (need) satisfaction 
combines mental state accounts with preference satisfaction accounts 
of well-being (see Shaw 1999, chap. 2). Analogously, biodiversity is 
defined as all variation in life forms that are the result of natural evolu-
tion. 
5. Plugging someone in a hypothetical “experience machine” (Nozick 
1974) that generates feelings of pleasure in a virtual reality does not nec-
essarily increase well-being, because well-being is not only composed of 
positive feelings, but those feelings need to be the result of preference 
satisfaction. An experience machine does not satisfy the needs for e.g. 
authenticity and activity. Similarly, one does not necessarily increase bio-
diversity by introducing new genes and genetically modified organisms, 
because those new life forms are not the result of evolution. Genetically 
modified species are intentionally created by intelligent beings and are 
not the product of a blind process of genetic mutation. The only possi-
ble strategy to increase someone’s well-being, is by eliminating obstacles 
that prevent preference satisfaction (i.e. eliminating barriers that enforce 
trade-offs or eliminating scarcities). Similarly, the only possible strat-
egy to increase biodiversity is by eliminating ecosystem pressures that 
increase competition over scarce resources. 
All in all, well-being is for a sentient being what biodiversity is for a 
natural ecosystem. We should not lower well-being without good reason, 
and we also should not lower biodiversity without good reason. The only 
important disanalogy is that well-being is valued by the sentient being, 
whereas biodiversity is not valued by the ecosystem. 
It might be that the intuition about the permissibility of predation is a 
moral illusion. Nevertheless, its coherence with other intuitions about other 
kinds of harmful behavior, its unification in a 3-N-principle, its relation 
with the value of biodiversity and the analogy between well-being and bio-
diversity are not likely to be ad hoc rationalizations to solve the predation 
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problem. If it was, it would be a very sophisticated rationalization. If moral 
agents democratically decide that a value of biodiversity is implausible, we 
should intervene in the wild.
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